Does a mere availability of punishment increase cooperation in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game? In our experiment we observe that the subjects almost never use punishment. Consistently, the data shows no increase in the cooperation rate as the subjects correctly anticipated that they would not be punished for defection. Thus, for certain parameter values, the availability of punishment is ineffective in inducing cooperation. Moreover, we do not find any evidence that risk attitude is a factor when making the decision to cooperate.
Introduction
Does a mere availability of punishment increase cooperation? Ostrom et al. (1992) point out that allowing for sanctions imposed by peers increases cooperation in interactions where the individual interest is in conflict with the group interest and therefore, leads to socially superior outcomes. However, the punishment might change the strategic nature of the game and thus it is not obvious whether it is the altered incentives or the mere availability of punishment that shape the behavior. Moreover, many social and economic interactions are repeated in nature, confounding the effect of punishment with reputation building. To address these two issues we design an experiment that preserves the defection as dominant action and eliminates the opportunity of enforcing cooperation in future play.
Since Ostrom et al. (1992) a wide body of experimental literature has focused on the viability of various punishment schemes (either experimenter-imposed as in Falkinger et al., 2000; Dickinson, 2001; Croson et al., 2006 or participant-imposed as in the strand of literature that originated with Fehr and Gächter, 2000) to enhance cooperative efforts. In the participant-imposed punishment experiments the punishment usually is costly, yet many subjects use that opportunity to deter defection, as predicted by distributional models of otherregarding preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and Rabin 2002) . The presence of a sanctioning mechanism thus enables reaping the benefits of cooperation in the long-run (Gächter, et al. 2008 ).
Most of the previous research on punishment is set in a repeated voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) and does not provide a clear-cut answer to our research question. While it would be possible to construct a one-shot two-player VCM scenario with punishment, we believe that simplicity of experimental design is a virtue and therefore we have embedded our explorations in a prisoner's dilemma game in which the players have only two actions. Each player decides whether to defect and maximize their own monetary payoffs or to cooperate and maximize the joint surplus (see Roth, 1988) . The primary reason for the one-shot horizon is the necessity of independence of subjects' decisions on the previous play. 1 Interestingly, the costly punishment is a public good itself and several studies (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2002) provide evidence that not all individuals punish. Therefore, the (strategic) 1 Despite the extensive literature on cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and numerous studies on punishment in the repeated VCM, we are not aware of any studies exploring the effect of punishment in a one shot prisoner's dilemma. Although the prisoner's dilemma incorporates motivations present also in the VCM there is no experimental evidence whether (the availability of) punishment increases cooperation. Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2009) bridge the literature between a repeated prisoner's dilemma and VCM without punishment. They find that subjects behave more cooperatively in the prisoner's dilemma than in the VCM if they are in a group of four players but do not find a difference if the two games are played in pairs 3 uncertainty associated with a chance of being punished is likely to be an important determinant of cooperating behavior. Becker (1968) assumes that subjects use the expected probability of being punished when evaluating their actions. Based on this motivation we also explore in our experiment whether the decision-maker's risk attitude sheds any light on individuals' willingness to cooperate.
The Experiment
Out experiment consists of two treatments, Baseline and Punishment, implemented in an across subjects design. In each treatment a prisoner's dilemma game is played. The game payoffs (presented in Table 1 ) are denoted in Euros. The row player chooses Top (cooperation) or Bottom (defection), while the column player chooses Left (cooperation) or Right (defection). In Punishment, after being notified of the result of the prisoner's dilemma game, subjects could decrease their counterpart's payoff by 2 Euros at the cost of 1 Euro to themselves; in Baseline there was no punishment stage. 2 All information was common knowledge.
The demand for punishment depends on the price subjects have to pay for destroying a unit of the other person's monetary payoff. Carpenter (2002) , Falk et al. (2005) and Nikiforakis and Normann (2008) all find that more effective punishment technologies lead to more punishment. Our effectiveness of 2:1 is slightly lower than the average used in the VCM literature, but the occurrence of punishment is still reported for even lower effectiveness than ours. This design was driven by a consideration of not allowing subjects to make losses, as this was the policy of the laboratory where the experiment was run. An alternative way of avoiding the subjects making losses was to significantly increase the show up fees. However, this could potentially cause the subjects to perceive the game payoffs as relatively small and alter their behavior.
The experiment was conducted at the SonderForschungsBereich 504 laboratory at the Upon entering the laboratory subjects were randomly assigned a seat and paired according to a pre-assigned matching protocol. The instructions were neutrally framed and subjects were encouraged to ask questions. The questions were asked and answered individually. After subjects had made their Baseline/Punishment treatment decisions, the Holt and Laury (2002) risk attitude elicitation task was conducted. Subjects were informed beforehand that there would be an additional individual task, but not about the nature of this task. At the end of the session subjects filled out a questionnaire. 3 All subjects were paid privately and individually. Each subject received the following amount: an endowment of 5 Euro plus the earnings in the prisoner's dilemma minus the punishment minus the punishment costs plus a payment for one randomly chosen lottery from the risk attitude elicitation task. All lotteries were resolved by rolling a 10-sided die at the time of the payment.
Hypotheses
For self-regarding subjects, defecting in the prisoner's dilemma and not punishing in the second stage is a dominant strategy.
Hypothesis 1a: Cooperation (self-regarding)
Subjects will never cooperate and never punish.
The Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of inequality aversion that has been prominently used in the punishment literature to explain the behavior of subjects, offers a different prediction: For sufficiently big values of the parameter for disadvantageous inequality aversion, α, subjects will punish. Similarly, subjects with high values of advantageous inequality aversion, β, will cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma. 4 Hypothesis 1b: Cooperation (inequality-averse)
Strongly inequality-averse subjects will cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma and punish defectors.
How does the strategic uncertainty of the game influence risk-averse subjects? If subjects expect that some of the other subjects are strongly inequality-averse, while some are selfregarding or only weakly inequality-averse, they will form subjective beliefs about the probability of being punished for defection. Then, due to the uncertainty, the payoff from defection is smaller for risk-averse subjects than for risk-neutral ones. On the other hand, the payoff from cooperation is similar for both, assuming that the probability of being punished for cooperating is close to zero.
Hypothesis 2: Risk-aversion
In Punishment, risk-averse subjects will cooperate more than risk-neutral ones. Table 2 presents subjects' behavior in the prisoner's dilemma game and in the punishment stage. In Baseline 43.2% of subjects chose to cooperate with their partner. The cooperation rate decreased to 32.9% with the introduction of punishment. 5 However, this decrease is not statistically significant (2-sided Fisher exact test p-value = 0.360). We observe only one instance of punishment despite a relatively large number of subjects in the punishment treatment (n = 70).
Results
Our subjects' behavior supports the prediction of the self-regarding preferences model with regard to punishment, as the subjects were unwilling to spend resources to decrease the payoff of the other person in a one-shot game. However, self-regarding subjects would never cooperate in the prisoner's dilemma. The observed behavior is thus consistent with the predictions of the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion given values of α lower than 1 and a range of values of β. No change in the cooperation rate in conjunction with the lack of punishing behavior suggests that subjects rationally expected that they would not be punished for defection. To assess the effect of risk aversion on cooperation, we run a probit regression and report the results in Table 3. 6 Punishment is a dummy variable for the respective treatment;
Risk Attitude is the number of safe choices in the risk attitude elicitation task; Risk Attitude*Punishment is the interaction term between risk attitude and the punishment treatment; Inconsistent is a dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the subject "jumped" back and forth between lotteries in the risk attitude elicitation task; 7 Age and Male are the subject's age and gender as reported in the post-experimental questionnaire. The estimated coefficients are presented in the first column: We find no significant effect for the interaction term and thus no support for Hypothesis 2. This is robust to excluding the demographic variables (results presented on the right hand side of Table 3 ) and to representing the risk attitude by a dummy for risk averse subjects instead of the number of safe choices. Number of observations = 114 6 As expected under random treatment allocation of subjects, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on the distribution of the cut-off value in the Holt and Laury task shows that there is no significant difference in the distribution of risk attitudes between the two treatments. 7 In total, there are 6 inconsistent subjects (1 in Baseline and 5 in Punishment). 8 For the obvious reason of having no data on punishment we cannot study the effect of risk attitude on the decision to punish. 7
Discussion
This paper reports an experiment designed to study the effect of punishment on cooperation in a one-shot prisoner's dilemma. We observe that our subjects almost never use punishment. Consistent with this finding, including a punishment stage had no significant effect on the cooperation rate, suggesting that subjects correctly anticipated that they would not be punished for defection. Our results thus point out that for certain parameter values the availability of punishment is ineffective. Moreover, we do not find any evidence that risk attitude is a factor when making a decision to cooperate.
The latter finding might be due to the anticipated absence of punishment and/or connected with the use of Holt and Laury's measure of risk attitudes that might be not appropriate for punishment decisions such as the one presented in this paper. Studies by Isaac and James (2000) and Dave et al. (2007) point out that different techniques of measuring risk attitudes yield significantly different estimates and a recent paper by Deck et al. (2009) finds that their subjects behave as though Holt and Laury task was an investment decision.
At the first glance, the low occurrence of punishment seems to be at odds with the literature on repeated public goods VCM where punishment successfully deters free riding.
However, Walker and Halloran (2004) find that in one-shot VCM the punishment threat does not affect cooperation rates. Therefore, it appears that, if there is no future, subjects are reluctant to waste their resources on punishment.
[Only in Punishment] INSTRUCTIONS -STAGE 2
Your Decision in Stage 2: After learning the other player's decision in Stage 1, you can decrease the other player's payoff by 2 Euro at the cost of 1 Euro to you.
If you decide to decrease the other player's payoff, you will circle the words "I want to decrease the other player's payoff."
If you decide to not change the other player's payoff, you will circle the words "I do not want to change the other player's payoff."
The other player can also decrease your payoff or leave it unchanged.
[Only in Punishment] DECISION FORM -STAGE 2
Do you want to decrease the other player's payoff by 2 Euro at the cost of 1 Euro to you? Please circle.
I want to decrease the other player's payoff.
OR I do not want to change the other player's payoff.
RISK ATTITUDE ELICITATION
The next page shows ten decision questions. Each decision is a paired choice between "Option A" and "Option B."
You will make ten choices and record these in the box to the left of the option. That is, if you prefer option A to option B, you will mark an X by option A. Only one of the ten decisions will be used in the end to determine your earnings for this part of the experiment.
A ten-sided die will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are numbered from 1 to 10 (the "0" face of the die will serve as 10.) After you have made all of your choices, you will throw this die twice, once to select one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected. Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earnings, but you will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. Now, please look at Decision 1 at the top. Option A pays $2.00 if the throw of the ten sided die is 1, and it pays $1.60 if the throw is 2-10. Option B yields $3.85 if the throw of the die is 1, and it pays $0.10 if the throw is 2-10. The other Decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the die will not be needed since each option pays the highest payoff for sure, so your choice here is between $2.00 Euro or $3.85.
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.
When you are finished, we will collect your decision sheet. Again, two persons from the class will be randomly selected to receive the monetary payoffs. To determine the payoffs from this task you will throw the ten-sided die to select which of the ten Decisions will be used. Then you will throw the die again to determine the money earnings for the Option you chose for that Decision. If you are selected, earnings (in $) for this choice will be paid to you in cash when we finish.
So now please look at the empty boxes on the record sheet. You will have to mark an X in one and only one of the boxes in each row, depending whether you prefer option A or option B. Then the die throw will determine which of the ten decisions is going to count. We will look at the decision that you made for the one that counts, and circle it, before throwing the die again to determine your earnings for this part.
DECISION FORM Option A
2.00€ with probability of 1/10, 1.60€ with probability of 9/10 OR 2.00€with probability of 2/10, 1.60€ with probability of 8/10 OR 2.00€ with probability of 3/10, 1.60€ with probability of 7/10 OR 2.00€ with probability of 4/10, 1.60€ with probability of 6/10 OR 2.00€ with probability of 5/10, 1.60€ with probability of 5/10 OR 2.00€ with probability of 6/10, 1.60€ with probability of 4/10 OR 2.00€ with probability of 7/10, 1.60€ with probability of 3/10 OR 2.00€ with probability of 8/10, 1.60€ with probability of 2/10 OR 2.00€ with probability of 9/10, 1.60€ with probability of 1/10 OR 2.00€ with probability of 10/10, 1.60€ with probability of 0/10 OR
Option B
3.85€ with probability of 1/10, 0.10€ with probability of 9/10 3.85€ with probability of 2/10, 0.10€ with probability of 8/10 3.85€ with probability of 3/10, 0.10€ with probability of 7/10 3.85€ with probability of 4/10, 0.10€ with probability of 6/10 3.85€ with probability of 5/10, 0.10€ with probability of 5/10 3.85€ with probability of 6/10, 0.10€ with probability of 4/10 3.85€ with probability of 7/10, 0.10€ with probability of 3/10 3.85€ with probability of 8/10, 0.10€ with probability of 2/10 3.85€ with probability of 9/10, 0.10€ with probability of 1/10 3.85€ with probability of 10/10, 0.10€ with probability of 0/10
